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Recent Cases
FEDERAL PROCEDURE-REMOVAL JURISDICTION-WHEN FEDERAL QUESTION
IS INVOLVED
Stewart v. Hickman1
Plaintiff sued in a Missouri circuit court for damages under the Fair Labor
Standards Acts totalling $2,192.06. By the terms of the Act an action brought to
enforce its provisions may be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction.
Defendant removed to the federal district court, which remanded the case to the
state court. On a motion for rehearing the court maintained its position that
the case should be remanded, holding that the suit did not so arise under the
Constitution or laws of the United States3 as to make it removable.
As the value of the matter in controversy was plainly less than the $3,000
necessary for federal jurisdiction based on suit arising under the laws of the
United States, there was a sound and easy rationalization for the decision. The
court was aware of this,4 but chose to base its decision on the more debatable
ground that the case raised no federal question. In support of this contention
the court cited a number of cases which assert that before a case is removable
to the federal courts on the ground of a federal question there must be a real
and substantial dispute as to the effect or construction of the Constitution or laws
of the United States.
The first case5 cited was a suit on a contract to construct a telegraph line
along the railroad. Removal to the federal courts was attempted on the ground
that it was a suit arising under the laws of the United States. This suit was
brought on a private contract, and did not depend on an act of Congress for its
very existence.
Another case8 quoted for the same principle was a bill to quiet title to land;
the potential federal question on which removal was sought involved the con-
struction of a treaty7 which was a link in the chain of title. It is clear that the
cause of action was not based on this treaty; a bill to quiet title to land need not,
of necessity, involve a federal act and any effect it might have on the result
would be incidental to the effect of the rules of property law, which would govern
1. 36 F. Supp. 861 (W. D. Mo. 1941).
2. The case arose under § 16 (b) of the Act, being § 216 (b), Tit. 29
U. S. C. A.
3. Jud. Code § 28, 28 U. S. C. A. § 71.
4. "'Competent jurisdiction' of the federal .court ordinarily means that
the amount in controversy must exceed $3,000 and that there must be a federal
question or a diversity of citizenship." Stewart v. Hickman, 36 F. Supp. 861,
862 (W. D. Mo. 1941).
5. Western Union Telegraph v. Ann Arbor R. R., 178 U. S. 239 (1900).
6. Devine v. Los Angeles, 202 U. S. 313 (1906); cf. Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (U. S. 1816).
7. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Act of March 3, 1851.
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the decision. If this were not true, every suit involving the title to land ultimate-
ly dependent upon a federal patent would be removable to the federal courts.
A third case s was an action for the use and benefit of a holder of street
improvement bonds. A receiver of a national bank became a party and attempted
to remove to a federal court on the ground of a federal question, since the
office of receiver of a national bank is created by the laws of the United States.
It was correctly held that the case was not removable on this ground, since the
federal question had only an inconsequential relation to the issues of the suit.
The distinction between these cases and Stewart v. Hickman seems clear.
Here the suit is brought on a federal act which establishes the cause of action
sued upon. Without this act there would be no right of recovery in the plaintiff
at all. While the cases discussed above all seem to be correctly decided and
all uphold a valid doctrine, it does not seem that the principal case comes within
that doctrine. Those cases apply the ideas set out in Gulley V. First National
Bank in Meridian,9 that the broad federal jurisdiction which Chief Justice Mar-
shall asserted in Osborn v. Bank of the United States0 should be restricted and
cut down. This is clearly the prevailing view of the courts today, but it does
not follow that a case which depends for its entire existence on a federal statute
does not arise under the laws of the United States.
The case of Robertson v. Argus Hosiery Mills, Inc." is cited by the court as
showing that in cases arising under laws regulating commerce, the cause of ac-
tion must bear a reasonable relation to the regulatory provision relied on
before jurisdiction would follow. The court there held it did not have juris-
diction as a result of the commerce clause, and since there was less than the
jurisdictional amount involved, the cause was dismissed. While this case is
authority for the proposition that the federal court in the principal case could
not remove on the basis of the jurisdiction given them over cases involving com-
merce, it does not establish that a federal question was not involved here, upon
which the case could have been removed if the proper jurisdictional amount had
been involved.
The distinction between the cases cited by the court and the problem in
Stewart v. Hickman lies in the problem of whether or not the federal question
is the actual basis of the suit.1 2 It seems that it is in the principal case. A
casel s involving a problem identical to that of Stewart v. Hickman was held to
8. City of Corbin v. Varden, 18 F. Supp. 531 (E. D. Ky. 1937).
9. 299 U. S. 109 (1936).
10. 9 Wheat. 738 (U. S. 1824).
11. 32 F. Supp. 19 (E. D. Tenn., 1940) (under Fair Labor Standards Act).
But see Wingate v. General Auto Parts Co., 40 F. Supp. 364 (W. D. Mo. 1941).
12. "An examination of these cases, however, will generally show that the
right asserted in the complaint was not a right created by federal law. On the
contrary, such law was only indirectly and remotely concerned, and the right
immediately in litigation was created by state law."
"Whenever federal law grants a right of property or of action, and a suitis brought to enforce that right, such a suit arises under the law creating the
right, within the meaning of statutes defining the jurisdiction of federal courts."
McGoon v. Northern Pac. Ry., 204 Fed. 998, 1001 (N. D. 1913).
13. Ricciardi v. Lazzara Baking Corp., 32 F. Supp. 956 (N. J. 1940) (suit onFair Labor Standards Act for overtime, damages, and attorney's fees) contra,
Wingate v. General Auto Parts Co., 40 F. Supp. 364 (W, D. Mo. 1941).
[Vol. 6
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be removable to the federal courts, the court holding that the word "maintained"
in the "jurisdictional" clause of the Fair Labor Standards Act 14 was subject to
such varied interpretations that it could not be used to amend the removal act
to make such a case not removable. It is possible that this term was used to
mean that once a state court took jurisdiction it should retain it; but, it is
just as possible that it was used to permit a concurrent jurisdiction in the
state court which otherwise it might not have had. Of course, unless the
state court had such original jurisdiction there would have been no removal ques-
tion here at all.15 It was also stated that if Congress had intended to prevent
removal of causes arising under this act it would have used language more
pertinent to that end, as it has on several occasions when this end was desired.1 6
The court also cited cases showing that the federal question must appear
in the plaintiff's petition before removal could be had.17 This, again, is a sound
and well substantiated doctrine; but, it seems that these authorities fail to
show that the principal case could not still come within the removal doctrine. It
is hard to see how the plaintiff in Stewart v. Hickman could have drawn a dec-
laration without involving the federal act upon which his entire case rested.
The oft repeated statement that to be a question that results in removal
there must be a construction of a law of the United States seems to be an am-
biguous phrase which requires some analysis. The better view seems to be
that by this language the courts mean a case where the application of a federal
law is necessary to the decision of the case,18 as was true of Stewart v. Hickman.
ELDIUS MONROE
14. "Action to recover such liability may be maintained in any court of
competent jurisdiction." 29 U. S. C. A. § 216.
15. Lambert Co. v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 258 U. S. 377 (1921); Venner v.
Mich. Cent. R. R., 271 U. S. 127 (1925).
16. E. g., 36 STAT. 1094 (1911) 28 U. S. C. A., § 71, ". . . that no case
arising under an act entitled 'An act relating to the liabilities of common
carriers by railroad to their employees in certain cases', approved April 22,
1908, or any amendment thereto, and brought in any state court of competent
jurisdiction, shall be removed to any court of the United States . .
17. Arkansas v. Kansas & T. Coal Co., 183 U. S. 185 (1901) (remanded
because of no original jurisdiction in federal court); Bankers' Mut. Cas. Co. v.
Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry., 192 U. S. 371 (1904) (plaintiff relied on
general negligence principles); Connolly v. First Natl. Bank-Detroit, 86 F.
(2d) 683 (C. C. A. 1936) (suit by receiver of state bank against national bank;
only demand was for a money judgment).
18. Seber v. Spring Oil Co., 33 F. Supp. 805 (N. D. Okla. 1940) (involved
application of rules and regulations of Secretary of Interior); Hartford Fire
Ins. Co. v. K. C. M. & 0. Ry. Co. of Texas, 251 Fed. 332 (N. D. Tex. 1918); Rogge
v. Michael Del Balso, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 499 (S. D. N. Y. 1936) (involved death
act for District of Columbia); McGoon v. Northern Pac. Ry., 204 Fed. 998
(S. E. N. D. 1913) (shipment of livestock in interstate commerce). Contra:
Leggett v. Great Northern Ry., 180 Fed. 314 (C. C. Minn. 1910); Miller v.
Illinois Central Ry., 168 Fed. 982 (C. C. N. D. Ga. 1909).
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PLEADING-EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE UNDER GENERAL DENIAL
Minter v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corporation'
Plaintiff sought recovery from defendant petroleum company of one cent
per gallon from operation of a filling station over a five year period. The answer
was a general denial. Held: leases in connection with letter written by plaintiff
showing that such amounts were not bargained for, and tank wagon tickets tend-
ing to show a settlement upon each delivery of gasoline are admissible because:
"It is well established that under a general denial evidence tending to show
plaintiff never had a cause of action is admissible."2
The above statement appears repeatedly in Missouri decisions.3 It is
true that it covers accurately many situations, especially when it goes to matters
of denial of allegations in the petition. It would seem that the principal case
would fall in this category.4 Lack of malice in malicious prosecution may be
shown under the general denial.5 The negligence of a fellow servant falls in a
class by itself. Where it is available as a defense, it may be raised under a general
denial.6 Though off-hand one would expect it to be pleaded specially, it goes to
show that a cause of action never existed, and may be shown under the general
denial. Certainly our rule covers this situation accurately. Of course the
statute of limitations,7 release,8, rescission9 and res judicatalO must be specially
pleaded.
On the other hand, contriblutory negligence," illegality, 12 fraud,13 justifica-
1. 147 S. W. (2d) 120 (Mo. 1941).
2. Id. at 123.
3. Some of the more recent cases are: Stein v. Battenfeld Oil & Grease Co.,
327 Mo. 804, 39 S. W. (2d) 345 (1931); State v. Thompson, 337 Mo. 328, 85 S.
W. (2d) 594 (1935) ; Connole v. Ill. Cent. Ry., 21 S. W. (2d) 907 (Mo. App. 1929) ;
Prewitt v. Witte, 224 Mo. App. 836, 26 S. W. (2d) 1020 (1930); Iven v. Winston
Bros. Co., 48 S. W. (2d) 125 (Mo. App. 1932); Smith v. St. Louis Public'Service
Co., 84 S. W. (2d) 161 (Mo. App. 1935).
4. For a similar case, see Hellmuth v. Benoist, 144 Mo. App. 695, 129
S. W. 257 (1910).
5. Sparling v. Conway, 75 Mo. 510, 512 (1882).
6. Kaminski v. Tudor Iron Works, 167 Mo. 462, 67 S. W. 221 (1901);
Guthrie v. Gillespie, 319 Mo. 1137, 6 S. W. (2d) 886 (1928).
7. Johnston v. Ragan, 265 Mo. 420, 178 S. W. 159 (1915); Linn Co. Bank
v. Clifton, 263 Mo. 200, 172 S. W. 388 (1914); However in ejectment the statute
need not be pleaded. Here the statute is relied on as a defense showing title.
Collins v. Pease, 146 Mo. 135, 47 S. W. 925 (1898).
8. Arnold v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 231 Mo.
App. 508, 101 S. W. (2d) 729 (1937); Nelson v. Kansas City Public Service Co.,
30 S. W. (2d) 1044 (Mo. App. 1930); Rivers v. Blom, 163 Mo. 442, 63 S. W. 812
(1901).
9. Riggins v. Mo. River, Ft. S. & G. R. R., 73 Mo. 598 (1881); Reynolds
v. Reynolds, 45 Mo. App. 622 (1891).
10. State ex rel. Schonhorst v. Henning, 55 Mo. App. 579, 580 (1893).
11. Donovan v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R. R., 89 Mo. 147, 1 S. W. 232(1886); Schide v. Gottschick & Remler, 329 Mo. 64, 43 S. W. (2d) 777 (1931).
12. St. Louis Agric. Ass'n v. Delano, 108 Mo. 217, 18 S. W. 1101 (1891);
But if such appears from the contract itself, it need not be so pleaded; School
District of Kansas City v. Sheidley, 138 Mo. 672, 40 S. W. 656 (1897).
13. Nichols v. Stevens, 123 Mo. 96, 25 S. W. 578 (1894); Barker Asphalt
Paving Co. v. Field, 188 Mo. 182, 86 S. W. 860 (1905).
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tion in false imprisonment, 14 self-defense in assault,15 and truthL6 are not ad-
missible under the general denial. Here the test fails to describe the decisions
because all of these defenses go to show that the plaintiff never had a cause of
action. On the other extreme is the holding that failure of consideration is
admissible under the general denial." Here it would appear that the plain-
tiff once had a cause of action.
It is interesting to trace the origin of the Missouri doctrine. Pomeroy' 8
states the text writers at common law commonly set out the distinction between
the plea by way of confession and avoidance and the general issue as follows:
"The general issue . . . put in issue the entire cause of action, and under
it the defendant was permitted to offer any evidence which showed that the
right of action never in fact existed." The plea by way of confession and avoid-
ance, "admitted . . that a cause of action once existed . . ., and set
up other and subsequently occurring facts which showed that the right after it had
occurred had been in some manner discharged, satisfied or defeated." Else-
wherelo Pomeroy cites Chitty2o for the related proposition that "pleas in bar as
well in actions on contracts as for torts, are of two descriptions: first, they deny
that the plaintiff ever had the cause of action complained of; or, secondly, they
admit that he once had a cause of action,--but insist that it no longer subsists."
It is conceivable that the doctrine of the principal case was taken from some such
classification.
Further, the general issue in assumpsit, to wit, non assumpsit, which literally
only denies that the defendant ever promised, was very broad.2" Practically
anything going to show there was not a cause of action at the time of suit
could be shown under the same. Included in this would be any evidence that
%vent to the original validity of the contract. Bliss22 points out some have sup-
posed that a defendant should be permitted under the code to prove any facts
under a general denial which shows that the contract when made was invalid;
that is, that a cause of action never existed. Indeed, he cites the case which
started the doctrine in Missouri.2" This would seem to indicate our doctrine
originated in the general issue in assumpsit.
It is impossible to be certain about this matter of ancestry, however, as
the court first enunciating the doctrine in Missouri 24 cites no authorities. It
arbitrarily states: "Where a cause of action which once existed has been de-
termined by some matter which subsequently transpired, such new matter must, to
comply with the statute, be specially pleaded; but where the cause of action al-
14. Pandjiris v. Hartman, 196 Mo. 539, 94 S. W. 270 (1906).
15. Atchison v. Procise, 24 S. W. (2d) 187 (Mo. App. 1930); Brown v.
Barr, 184 Mo. App. 451, 171 S. W. 4 (1914); O'Leary v. Rowan, 31 Mo. 117
(1860). Cf. Nichols v. Winfrey, 79 Mo. 544 (1883).
16. Sotham v. Drovers Telegram Co., 239 Mo. 606, 144 S. W. 428 (1911).
17. 'Rico v. Peters, 185 S. W. 752 (Mo. App. 1916).
18. POMEROY, REMEDIES AND REMEDIAL RIGHTS (1875) § 672.
19. Id. at § 644.
20. CHITTY, PLEADING (16th Am. ed. by Perkins) 489.
21. SHIPMAN, COMMON LAW PLEADING (3rd ed. 1923) § 182.
22. BLISS, CODE PLEADING (3rd ed. 1894) § 352.
23. Greenway v. James, 34 Mo. 326, 328 (1864).
24. Ibid.
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leged never existed, the appropriate defence under the law is a denial of the
material allegations of the petition; and such facts as tend to disprove the
controverted allegations are pertinent to the issue." It is entirely possible that
the learned judge meant that under a denial, a defendant may prove any affirma-
tive rival facts disproving facts alleged by the plaintiff. Certainly no objection
could be taken to such an interpretation. But the statement which has been so
mechanically repeated can also be taken to mean that the defendant may prove
any facts that go to show that a cause of action never existed in the plaintiff.
When so broadly construed, the test does not square with many of the decisions.25
At any rate the Missouri test in its present form is inaccurate and misleading
and should be abandoned by the courts.
We find other attempted solutions for the general problem of what must be
specially pleaded. Clark states that in so far as there tends to be a conscious
statement of a definite rule it is that a denial of what is proper and necessary in
the complaint will place the same in issue.2 6  This rule based on logic has
obvious exceptions such as payment. 27 New York follows the English rule.28
There a matter must be specially pleaded if it would otherwise lead to surprise
or would raise issues of fact not arising out of the previous pleadings. The
new Federal Rules2 9 explicitly set forth a list of defenses which are to be affim-
atively pleaded. The list is not exclusive however and other matters constituting
an avoidance or affirmative defense must be specially pleaded.
JOSEPH W. HARDY
25. See Notes 10-16, supra.
26. CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 416.
27. Id. at 422.
28. N.Y. C.P.A. § 242.
29. Rule 8c reads: "In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set
forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption
of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, fail-
ure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license,
payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver
and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense ....
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